Learning Design Specialization

Epistemology

Whose knowledge counts, and on what grounds. Every resource in this branch, with its grounding, sources, and relationships, set out in reading order.

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Section 1

About this branch

The conditions under which a knowledge claim is admitted, discounted, or never formed at all — the questions that arise before evidence is appraised rather than during it. This branch gathers the contributions that give a design process language for how it decides what will count as knowledge, and for what the exclusions cost. It supplies analysis; the standing commitments to communities and to Indigenous knowledge holders remain with the branches and instruments that carry them.

Grounding. Social epistemology; epistemic injustice; science and technology studies; socio-legal epistemology of evidence

Every contribution in this set is practised; the status on each shows whether a public resource about it exists yet.

This set at a glance
Resources in this branch12
With a live page0
Practised · resource in development or not yet written12

Visit the Epistemology page · See this set in the context of the whole practice.

Section 2

The 12 resources in this branch

Each entry states what the resource contributes, what grounds it, whether a live page exists, the resources most like it within this set, and the connections that run beyond it.

What a Sound Knowledge Process Looks Like

The entry node · the standard the rest of the branch measures against

Practised · resource not yet written

Four conditions rendered for design work: real avenues through which criticism can travel while a decision can still change, demonstrable uptake of that criticism, standards of evidence agreed before evidence is gathered, and authority that tracks relevant knowledge rather than rank. They are necessary rather than sufficient — they make error detectable, not absent — and the fourth cannot be self-certified, which is why it is written as an arrangement a process submits to rather than a check it performs on itself.

Grounding. Critical contextual empiricism (Longino); strong objectivity (Harding); veritistic social epistemology (Goldman)

Sources

  • Reference 1: Longino, H. E. (2002). The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
  • Reference 2: Harding, S. (1986). The Science Question in Feminism. Cornell University Press.
  • Reference 3: Goldman, A. I. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press.

Most related, by shared theory and theme

Connected contributions

Where this work leads

When Testimony Becomes Evidence

The criterion an evidence hierarchy cannot supply

Practised · resource not yet written

What makes a firsthand account count as evidence, and equally what makes a claim fail regardless of who holds it. It is the contribution that keeps a widened set of knowers from becoming an unlimited set of claims, and it leaves appraisal discipline — distinguishing a robust finding from folklore — fully intact.

Grounding. Epistemology of testimony (Coady; Lackey); epistemic dependence (Hardwig); testimonial injustice (Fricker)

Sources

  • Reference 4: Coady, C. A. J. (1992). Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
  • Reference 5: Lackey, J. (2008). Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  • Reference 6: Hardwig, J. (1985). “Epistemic Dependence.” The Journal of Philosophy, 82(7), 335–349.
  • Reference 7: Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.

Most related, by shared theory and theme

Connected contributions

Where this work leads

The Invisible Rules of Admissibility

The diagnostic · specifiable rules rather than bias

Practised · resource not yet written

Sequencing, genre, the credential gate, proxy substitution, small-n erasure, safety closure, and the upstream lock: named filters that settle what enters a record before anything in it is weighed. Naming them as rules rather than as bias is what makes them examinable, and correctable, by the room that has just applied one.

Grounding. Epistemic injustice (Fricker; Dotson); socio-legal work on admissibility, expert qualification, and burden of proof

Sources

  • Reference 7: Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
  • Reference 8: Dotson, K. (2011). “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing.” Hypatia, 26(2), 236–257.
  • Reference 9: Jasanoff, S. (1995). Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America. Harvard University Press.
  • Reference 10: Twining, W. (1990). Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays. Basil Blackwell (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2006).
  • Reference 11: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) — the admissibility standard for expert evidence in United States federal courts.

Most related, by shared theory and theme

Connected contributions

Where this work leads

Knowledge That Was Never Produced

The absence that leaves no trace

Practised · resource not yet written

Questions never funded, populations never studied, outcomes never defined. Nothing was excluded because nothing was submitted, which makes non-production the likeliest reason an evidence base looks thin and the hardest thing to detect from inside a literature search.

Grounding. Agnotology (Proctor & Schiebinger); structured ignorance (Mills); Tuana

Sources

  • Reference 12: Proctor, R. N., & Schiebinger, L. (Eds.). (2008). Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance. Stanford University Press.
  • Reference 13: Mills, C. W. (2007). “White Ignorance.” In S. Sullivan & N. Tuana (Eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. State University of New York Press.
  • Reference 14: Tuana, N. (2006). “The Speculum of Ignorance: The Women’s Health Movement and Epistemologies of Ignorance.” Hypatia, 21(3), 1–19.

Most related, by shared theory and theme

Connected contributions

Where this work leads

Experience Without Language

Hermeneutical injustice · when the account cannot be formed

Practised · resource not yet written

Nobody is disbelieved and no claim is rejected: the concept required to state the experience does not yet exist in the shared interpretive resource. It leaves no trace in a consultation record, so a process that measures only what was said will read it as an absence of concern.

Grounding. Hermeneutical and contributory injustice (Fricker; Dotson); idioms of distress (Nichter); Kleinman

Sources

  • Reference 7: Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
  • Reference 8: Dotson, K. (2011). “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing.” Hypatia, 26(2), 236–257.
  • Reference 15: Nichter, M. (1981). “Idioms of Distress: Alternatives in the Expression of Psychosocial Distress.” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 5(4), 379–408.
  • Reference 16: Kleinman, A. (1977). “Depression, Somatization and the ‘New Cross-Cultural Psychiatry’.” Social Science & Medicine, 11(1), 3–10 — the source of the category fallacy.

Most related, by shared theory and theme

Connected contributions

Where this work leads

Making as Knowing

Whether knowing-how is knowledge in the same sense

Practised · resource not yet written

The form of knowledge most present in craft, facilitation, and clinical practice, and least legible to a hierarchy built for claims. Elicitation methods presuppose an answer to this question and rarely state it, which is the point at which a tacit account is either carried into a design or lost at the interview.

Grounding. Knowing-how (Ryle); tacit knowledge (Polanyi; H. Collins); reflective practice (Schön)

Sources

  • Reference 17: Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson — the source of the knowing-how and knowing-that distinction.
  • Reference 18: Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. University of Chicago Press.
  • Reference 19: Collins, H. (2010). Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. University of Chicago Press.
  • Reference 20: Schön, D. A. (1983). The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. Basic Books.

Most related, by shared theory and theme

Connected contributions

Where this work leads

Warranted Trust and the Division of Cognitive Labour

When deference is well-grounded rather than deferential

Practised · resource not yet written

Nobody verifies most of what they know, so dependence is the ordinary condition of expertise rather than a lapse in it. This contribution sets out the grounds on which trust in an expert, a source, or a community is warranted, alongside the documented cases in which expertise established outside formal credentials has held up against expertise inside them.

Grounding. Epistemic dependence (Hardwig); epistemology of expertise (Goldman); interactional expertise (Collins & Evans); civic epistemology (Jasanoff)

Sources

  • Reference 6: Hardwig, J. (1985). “Epistemic Dependence.” The Journal of Philosophy, 82(7), 335–349.
  • Reference 3: Goldman, A. I. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press.
  • Reference 21: Collins, H., & Evans, R. (2007). Rethinking Expertise. University of Chicago Press.
  • Reference 22: Epstein, S. (1996). Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge. University of California Press.
  • Reference 23: Wynne, B. (1992). “Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social Identities and Public Uptake of Science.” Public Understanding of Science, 1(3), 281–304 — the Cumbrian sheep farmers study.
  • Reference 24: Jasanoff, S. (2005). Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States. Princeton University Press — the source of civic epistemology.

Most related, by shared theory and theme

Connected contributions

Where this work leads

Designing Under Disagreement

Deciding and building when knowledgeable people conflict

Practised · resource not yet written

Disagreement between well-informed people working inside a single framework, where a decision still has to be made and something still has to be built to a deadline. It covers what the disagreement is itself evidence of, and which deliberative arrangements produce a defensible decision rather than the loudest one.

Grounding. Peer disagreement (Feldman & Warfield); deliberative method (Fishkin; Landemore); participatory design (Ehn)

Sources

  • Reference 25: Feldman, R., & Warfield, T. A. (Eds.). (2010). Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
  • Reference 26: Fishkin, J. S. (2009). When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation. Oxford University Press.
  • Reference 27: Landemore, H. (2013). Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many. Princeton University Press.
  • Reference 28: Ehn, P. (1988). Work-Oriented Design of Computer Artifacts. Arbetslivscentrum.

Most related, by shared theory and theme

Connected contributions

Where this work leads

When Integration Becomes Assimilation

Where synthesis is the wrong instrument

Practised · resource not yet written

Two knowledge systems can answer the same question incompatibly, and integrating them under unequal power absorbs one into the other. Holding the conflict open is an arrangement to be maintained rather than a deliverable to be produced. This contribution coordinates with the Indigenous-led work held elsewhere on the map and does not stand in for it.

Grounding. Ethical space (Ermine); Two-Eyed Seeing (Bartlett, Marshall & Marshall); legal pluralism

Sources

  • Reference 29: Ermine, W. (2007). “The Ethical Space of Engagement.” Indigenous Law Journal, 6(1), 193–203.
  • Reference 30: Bartlett, C., Marshall, M., & Marshall, A. (2012). “Two-Eyed Seeing and Other Lessons Learned within a Co-Learning Journey of Bringing Together Indigenous and Mainstream Knowledges and Ways of Knowing.” Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, 2(4), 331–340.
  • Reference 10: Twining, W. (1990). Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays. Basil Blackwell (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Most related, by shared theory and theme

Connected contributions

Where this work leads

The Construct Inside the Measure

How an instrument decides which outcomes become visible

Practised · resource not yet written

An instrument encodes a construct, and choosing it settles in advance what will be able to register as an outcome. Where the construct does not hold in the setting, the measure returns nothing on something that worked, or an effect on something nobody intended.

Grounding. Construct validity (Messick; Borsboom et al.); category fallacy (Kleinman); idioms of distress (Nichter)

Sources

  • Reference 31: Messick, S. (1995). “Validity of Psychological Assessment: Validation of Inferences from Persons’ Responses and Performances as Scientific Inquiry into Score Meaning.” American Psychologist, 50(9), 741–749.
  • Reference 32: Borsboom, D., Mellenbergh, G. J., & van Heerden, J. (2004). “The Concept of Validity.” Psychological Review, 111(4), 1061–1071.
  • Reference 16: Kleinman, A. (1977). “Depression, Somatization and the ‘New Cross-Cultural Psychiatry’.” Social Science & Medicine, 11(1), 3–10 — the source of the category fallacy.
  • Reference 15: Nichter, M. (1981). “Idioms of Distress: Alternatives in the Expression of Psychosocial Distress.” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 5(4), 379–408.

Most related, by shared theory and theme

Connected contributions

Where this work leads

The Designer’s Own Position

The assumptions a method cannot catch on its own

Practised · resource not yet written

No method examines the assumptions it was built on, and elicitation presumes a neutral extractor. The correction is criticism from a differently positioned knower holding authority to overrule — an arrangement submitted to rather than a process run — which applies to the designer the same condition a sound knowledge process is asked to meet.

Grounding. Strong objectivity (Harding); situated knowledges (Haraway); Wylie; Hill Collins; Longino

Sources

  • Reference 2: Harding, S. (1986). The Science Question in Feminism. Cornell University Press.
  • Reference 33: Haraway, D. (1988). “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.” Feminist Studies, 14(3), 575–599.
  • Reference 34: Wylie, A. (2003). “Why Standpoint Matters.” In R. Figueroa & S. Harding (Eds.), Science and Other Cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology. Routledge.
  • Reference 35: Collins, P. H. (1990). Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. Unwin Hyman.
  • Reference 1: Longino, H. E. (2002). The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton University Press.

Most related, by shared theory and theme

Connected contributions

Where this work leads

Designing For and Within Practice-Based Research

When the work made is part of the finding

Practised · resource not yet written

Research-creation and practice-led inquiry produce knowledge through making, which changes how a project is scoped, supervised, documented and examined. Designing learning in these settings means building documentation into production rather than reconstructing it afterwards, and making the criteria for a practice-based contribution explicit to everyone assessing it.

A resource in two areas. Its home is Learning Experience Design, and it is also part of the Epistemology set.

Grounding. Practice as research (Barrett & Bolt); knowing-how (Ryle); tacit knowledge (Polanyi; Collins)

Sources

  • Reference 36: Barrett, E., & Bolt, B. (Eds.). (2010). Practice as Research: Approaches to Creative Arts Enquiry. I.B. Tauris.
  • Reference 17: Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson — the source of the knowing-how and knowing-that distinction.
  • Reference 18: Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. University of Chicago Press.
  • Reference 19: Collins, H. (2010). Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. University of Chicago Press.

Most related, by shared theory and theme

Connected contributions

Where this work leads

Section 3

References and resources

The theory, law, and standards these contributions are rooted in, listed once and cited by number above. Peer-reviewed, statutory, and institutional sources link directly. Books, reports, and legislation are cited in full so they can be found in any library catalogue or official register.

  1. Social epistemology1. Longino, H. E. (2002). The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
  2. Standpoint theory2. Harding, S. (1986). The Science Question in Feminism. Cornell University Press.
  3. Social epistemology3. Goldman, A. I. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press.
  4. Epistemology of testimony4. Coady, C. A. J. (1992). Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
  5. Epistemology of testimony5. Lackey, J. (2008). Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  6. Epistemology of testimony6. Hardwig, J. (1985). “Epistemic Dependence.” The Journal of Philosophy, 82(7), 335–349.
  7. Epistemic injustice7. Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
  8. Epistemic injustice8. Dotson, K. (2011). “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing.” Hypatia, 26(2), 236–257.
  9. Socio-legal epistemology9. Jasanoff, S. (1995). Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America. Harvard University Press.
  10. Socio-legal epistemology10. Twining, W. (1990). Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays. Basil Blackwell (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2006).
  11. Evidence law11. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) — the admissibility standard for expert evidence in United States federal courts.
  12. Agnotology12. Proctor, R. N., & Schiebinger, L. (Eds.). (2008). Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance. Stanford University Press.
  13. Agnotology13. Mills, C. W. (2007). “White Ignorance.” In S. Sullivan & N. Tuana (Eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. State University of New York Press.
  14. Agnotology14. Tuana, N. (2006). “The Speculum of Ignorance: The Women’s Health Movement and Epistemologies of Ignorance.” Hypatia, 21(3), 1–19.
  15. Construct validity15. Nichter, M. (1981). “Idioms of Distress: Alternatives in the Expression of Psychosocial Distress.” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 5(4), 379–408.
  16. Construct validity16. Kleinman, A. (1977). “Depression, Somatization and the ‘New Cross-Cultural Psychiatry’.” Social Science & Medicine, 11(1), 3–10 — the source of the category fallacy.
  17. Epistemology of practice17. Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson — the source of the knowing-how and knowing-that distinction.
  18. Epistemology of practice18. Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. University of Chicago Press.
  19. Epistemology of practice19. Collins, H. (2010). Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. University of Chicago Press.
  20. Reflective practice20. Schön, D. A. (1983). The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. Basic Books.
  21. Sociology of expertise21. Collins, H., & Evans, R. (2007). Rethinking Expertise. University of Chicago Press.
  22. Science and technology studies22. Epstein, S. (1996). Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge. University of California Press.
  23. Science and technology studies23. Wynne, B. (1992). “Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social Identities and Public Uptake of Science.” Public Understanding of Science, 1(3), 281–304 — the Cumbrian sheep farmers study.
  24. Science and technology studies24. Jasanoff, S. (2005). Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States. Princeton University Press — the source of civic epistemology.
  25. Peer disagreement25. Feldman, R., & Warfield, T. A. (Eds.). (2010). Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
  26. Deliberation26. Fishkin, J. S. (2009). When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation. Oxford University Press.
  27. Deliberation27. Landemore, H. (2013). Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many. Princeton University Press.
  28. Participatory design28. Ehn, P. (1988). Work-Oriented Design of Computer Artifacts. Arbetslivscentrum.
  29. Indigenous education29. Ermine, W. (2007). “The Ethical Space of Engagement.” Indigenous Law Journal, 6(1), 193–203.
    https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ilj/article/view/27669
  30. Indigenous knowledge30. Bartlett, C., Marshall, M., & Marshall, A. (2012). “Two-Eyed Seeing and Other Lessons Learned within a Co-Learning Journey of Bringing Together Indigenous and Mainstream Knowledges and Ways of Knowing.” Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, 2(4), 331–340.
  31. Assessment31. Messick, S. (1995). “Validity of Psychological Assessment: Validation of Inferences from Persons’ Responses and Performances as Scientific Inquiry into Score Meaning.” American Psychologist, 50(9), 741–749.
  32. Construct validity32. Borsboom, D., Mellenbergh, G. J., & van Heerden, J. (2004). “The Concept of Validity.” Psychological Review, 111(4), 1061–1071.
  33. Standpoint theory33. Haraway, D. (1988). “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.” Feminist Studies, 14(3), 575–599.
  34. Standpoint theory34. Wylie, A. (2003). “Why Standpoint Matters.” In R. Figueroa & S. Harding (Eds.), Science and Other Cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology. Routledge.
  35. Standpoint theory35. Collins, P. H. (1990). Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. Unwin Hyman.
  36. Practice-based research36. Barrett, E., & Bolt, B. (Eds.). (2010). Practice as Research: Approaches to Creative Arts Enquiry. I.B. Tauris.

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Every contribution on this page reflects applied work carried out with learners, design teams, and partner organizations, and is grounded in the scholarship listed above. An interactive version of this map presents the same content as a navigable diagram.