Section 2
The 12 resources in this branch
Each entry states what the resource contributes, what grounds it, whether a live page exists, the resources most like it within this set, and the connections that run beyond it.
What a Sound Knowledge Process Looks Like
The entry node · the standard the rest of the branch measures against
Practised · resource not yet written
Four conditions rendered for design work: real avenues through which criticism can travel while a decision can still change, demonstrable uptake of that criticism, standards of evidence agreed before evidence is gathered, and authority that tracks relevant knowledge rather than rank. They are necessary rather than sufficient — they make error detectable, not absent — and the fourth cannot be self-certified, which is why it is written as an arrangement a process submits to rather than a check it performs on itself.
Grounding. Critical contextual empiricism (Longino); strong objectivity (Harding); veritistic social epistemology (Goldman)
Sources
- Reference 1: Longino, H. E. (2002). The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
- Reference 2: Harding, S. (1986). The Science Question in Feminism. Cornell University Press.
- Reference 3: Goldman, A. I. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press.
Most related, by shared theory and theme
Connected contributions
Where this work leads
When Testimony Becomes Evidence
The criterion an evidence hierarchy cannot supply
Practised · resource not yet written
What makes a firsthand account count as evidence, and equally what makes a claim fail regardless of who holds it. It is the contribution that keeps a widened set of knowers from becoming an unlimited set of claims, and it leaves appraisal discipline — distinguishing a robust finding from folklore — fully intact.
Grounding. Epistemology of testimony (Coady; Lackey); epistemic dependence (Hardwig); testimonial injustice (Fricker)
Sources
- Reference 4: Coady, C. A. J. (1992). Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
- Reference 5: Lackey, J. (2008). Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
- Reference 6: Hardwig, J. (1985). “Epistemic Dependence.” The Journal of Philosophy, 82(7), 335–349.
- Reference 7: Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
Most related, by shared theory and theme
Connected contributions
Where this work leads
The Invisible Rules of Admissibility
The diagnostic · specifiable rules rather than bias
Practised · resource not yet written
Sequencing, genre, the credential gate, proxy substitution, small-n erasure, safety closure, and the upstream lock: named filters that settle what enters a record before anything in it is weighed. Naming them as rules rather than as bias is what makes them examinable, and correctable, by the room that has just applied one.
Grounding. Epistemic injustice (Fricker; Dotson); socio-legal work on admissibility, expert qualification, and burden of proof
Sources
- Reference 7: Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
- Reference 8: Dotson, K. (2011). “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing.” Hypatia, 26(2), 236–257.
- Reference 9: Jasanoff, S. (1995). Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America. Harvard University Press.
- Reference 10: Twining, W. (1990). Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays. Basil Blackwell (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- Reference 11: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) — the admissibility standard for expert evidence in United States federal courts.
Most related, by shared theory and theme
Connected contributions
Where this work leads
Knowledge That Was Never Produced
The absence that leaves no trace
Practised · resource not yet written
Questions never funded, populations never studied, outcomes never defined. Nothing was excluded because nothing was submitted, which makes non-production the likeliest reason an evidence base looks thin and the hardest thing to detect from inside a literature search.
Grounding. Agnotology (Proctor & Schiebinger); structured ignorance (Mills); Tuana
Sources
- Reference 12: Proctor, R. N., & Schiebinger, L. (Eds.). (2008). Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance. Stanford University Press.
- Reference 13: Mills, C. W. (2007). “White Ignorance.” In S. Sullivan & N. Tuana (Eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. State University of New York Press.
- Reference 14: Tuana, N. (2006). “The Speculum of Ignorance: The Women’s Health Movement and Epistemologies of Ignorance.” Hypatia, 21(3), 1–19.
Most related, by shared theory and theme
Connected contributions
Where this work leads
Experience Without Language
Hermeneutical injustice · when the account cannot be formed
Practised · resource not yet written
Nobody is disbelieved and no claim is rejected: the concept required to state the experience does not yet exist in the shared interpretive resource. It leaves no trace in a consultation record, so a process that measures only what was said will read it as an absence of concern.
Grounding. Hermeneutical and contributory injustice (Fricker; Dotson); idioms of distress (Nichter); Kleinman
Sources
- Reference 7: Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
- Reference 8: Dotson, K. (2011). “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing.” Hypatia, 26(2), 236–257.
- Reference 15: Nichter, M. (1981). “Idioms of Distress: Alternatives in the Expression of Psychosocial Distress.” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 5(4), 379–408.
- Reference 16: Kleinman, A. (1977). “Depression, Somatization and the ‘New Cross-Cultural Psychiatry’.” Social Science & Medicine, 11(1), 3–10 — the source of the category fallacy.
Most related, by shared theory and theme
Connected contributions
Where this work leads
Making as Knowing
Whether knowing-how is knowledge in the same sense
Practised · resource not yet written
The form of knowledge most present in craft, facilitation, and clinical practice, and least legible to a hierarchy built for claims. Elicitation methods presuppose an answer to this question and rarely state it, which is the point at which a tacit account is either carried into a design or lost at the interview.
Grounding. Knowing-how (Ryle); tacit knowledge (Polanyi; H. Collins); reflective practice (Schön)
Sources
- Reference 17: Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson — the source of the knowing-how and knowing-that distinction.
- Reference 18: Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. University of Chicago Press.
- Reference 19: Collins, H. (2010). Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. University of Chicago Press.
- Reference 20: Schön, D. A. (1983). The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. Basic Books.
Most related, by shared theory and theme
Connected contributions
Where this work leads
Warranted Trust and the Division of Cognitive Labour
When deference is well-grounded rather than deferential
Practised · resource not yet written
Nobody verifies most of what they know, so dependence is the ordinary condition of expertise rather than a lapse in it. This contribution sets out the grounds on which trust in an expert, a source, or a community is warranted, alongside the documented cases in which expertise established outside formal credentials has held up against expertise inside them.
Grounding. Epistemic dependence (Hardwig); epistemology of expertise (Goldman); interactional expertise (Collins & Evans); civic epistemology (Jasanoff)
Sources
- Reference 6: Hardwig, J. (1985). “Epistemic Dependence.” The Journal of Philosophy, 82(7), 335–349.
- Reference 3: Goldman, A. I. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press.
- Reference 21: Collins, H., & Evans, R. (2007). Rethinking Expertise. University of Chicago Press.
- Reference 22: Epstein, S. (1996). Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge. University of California Press.
- Reference 23: Wynne, B. (1992). “Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social Identities and Public Uptake of Science.” Public Understanding of Science, 1(3), 281–304 — the Cumbrian sheep farmers study.
- Reference 24: Jasanoff, S. (2005). Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States. Princeton University Press — the source of civic epistemology.
Most related, by shared theory and theme
Connected contributions
Where this work leads
Designing Under Disagreement
Deciding and building when knowledgeable people conflict
Practised · resource not yet written
Disagreement between well-informed people working inside a single framework, where a decision still has to be made and something still has to be built to a deadline. It covers what the disagreement is itself evidence of, and which deliberative arrangements produce a defensible decision rather than the loudest one.
Grounding. Peer disagreement (Feldman & Warfield); deliberative method (Fishkin; Landemore); participatory design (Ehn)
Sources
- Reference 25: Feldman, R., & Warfield, T. A. (Eds.). (2010). Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
- Reference 26: Fishkin, J. S. (2009). When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation. Oxford University Press.
- Reference 27: Landemore, H. (2013). Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many. Princeton University Press.
- Reference 28: Ehn, P. (1988). Work-Oriented Design of Computer Artifacts. Arbetslivscentrum.
Most related, by shared theory and theme
Connected contributions
Where this work leads
When Integration Becomes Assimilation
Where synthesis is the wrong instrument
Practised · resource not yet written
Two knowledge systems can answer the same question incompatibly, and integrating them under unequal power absorbs one into the other. Holding the conflict open is an arrangement to be maintained rather than a deliverable to be produced. This contribution coordinates with the Indigenous-led work held elsewhere on the map and does not stand in for it.
Grounding. Ethical space (Ermine); Two-Eyed Seeing (Bartlett, Marshall & Marshall); legal pluralism
Sources
- Reference 29: Ermine, W. (2007). “The Ethical Space of Engagement.” Indigenous Law Journal, 6(1), 193–203.
- Reference 30: Bartlett, C., Marshall, M., & Marshall, A. (2012). “Two-Eyed Seeing and Other Lessons Learned within a Co-Learning Journey of Bringing Together Indigenous and Mainstream Knowledges and Ways of Knowing.” Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, 2(4), 331–340.
- Reference 10: Twining, W. (1990). Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays. Basil Blackwell (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Most related, by shared theory and theme
Connected contributions
Where this work leads
The Construct Inside the Measure
How an instrument decides which outcomes become visible
Practised · resource not yet written
An instrument encodes a construct, and choosing it settles in advance what will be able to register as an outcome. Where the construct does not hold in the setting, the measure returns nothing on something that worked, or an effect on something nobody intended.
Grounding. Construct validity (Messick; Borsboom et al.); category fallacy (Kleinman); idioms of distress (Nichter)
Sources
- Reference 31: Messick, S. (1995). “Validity of Psychological Assessment: Validation of Inferences from Persons’ Responses and Performances as Scientific Inquiry into Score Meaning.” American Psychologist, 50(9), 741–749.
- Reference 32: Borsboom, D., Mellenbergh, G. J., & van Heerden, J. (2004). “The Concept of Validity.” Psychological Review, 111(4), 1061–1071.
- Reference 16: Kleinman, A. (1977). “Depression, Somatization and the ‘New Cross-Cultural Psychiatry’.” Social Science & Medicine, 11(1), 3–10 — the source of the category fallacy.
- Reference 15: Nichter, M. (1981). “Idioms of Distress: Alternatives in the Expression of Psychosocial Distress.” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 5(4), 379–408.
Most related, by shared theory and theme
Connected contributions
Where this work leads
The Designer’s Own Position
The assumptions a method cannot catch on its own
Practised · resource not yet written
No method examines the assumptions it was built on, and elicitation presumes a neutral extractor. The correction is criticism from a differently positioned knower holding authority to overrule — an arrangement submitted to rather than a process run — which applies to the designer the same condition a sound knowledge process is asked to meet.
Grounding. Strong objectivity (Harding); situated knowledges (Haraway); Wylie; Hill Collins; Longino
Sources
- Reference 2: Harding, S. (1986). The Science Question in Feminism. Cornell University Press.
- Reference 33: Haraway, D. (1988). “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.” Feminist Studies, 14(3), 575–599.
- Reference 34: Wylie, A. (2003). “Why Standpoint Matters.” In R. Figueroa & S. Harding (Eds.), Science and Other Cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology. Routledge.
- Reference 35: Collins, P. H. (1990). Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. Unwin Hyman.
- Reference 1: Longino, H. E. (2002). The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
Most related, by shared theory and theme
Connected contributions
Where this work leads
Designing For and Within Practice-Based Research
When the work made is part of the finding
Practised · resource not yet written
Research-creation and practice-led inquiry produce knowledge through making, which changes how a project is scoped, supervised, documented and examined. Designing learning in these settings means building documentation into production rather than reconstructing it afterwards, and making the criteria for a practice-based contribution explicit to everyone assessing it.
A resource in two areas. Its home is Learning Experience Design, and it is also part of the Epistemology set.
Grounding. Practice as research (Barrett & Bolt); knowing-how (Ryle); tacit knowledge (Polanyi; Collins)
Sources
- Reference 36: Barrett, E., & Bolt, B. (Eds.). (2010). Practice as Research: Approaches to Creative Arts Enquiry. I.B. Tauris.
- Reference 17: Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson — the source of the knowing-how and knowing-that distinction.
- Reference 18: Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. University of Chicago Press.
- Reference 19: Collins, H. (2010). Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. University of Chicago Press.
Most related, by shared theory and theme
Connected contributions
Where this work leads
Every contribution on this page reflects applied work carried out with learners, design teams, and partner organizations, and is grounded in the scholarship listed above. An interactive version of this map presents the same content as a navigable diagram.